ASEAN's diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia provided a foundation for creating its 'regional conductor' role after the Cold War. ASEAN's ability to sustain its roles depends on maintaining role bargains acceptable to the great powers, an increasingly difficult task due to great power rivalry in the South China Sea.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has played a prominent part in negotiating and managing order in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific, during times of stability and during times of transition and crisis when we would expect the great powers exclusively to play the leading role. What is interesting about ASEAN's contribution to order is that, rather than being a by-product of either the regional balance of power or the region's unique normative structure, it instead appears to constitute part of a division of labour negotiated with the great powers. After the US' failure in Vietnam led it to withdraw from mainland Southeast Asia in 1975 a situation emerged where the US provided security public goods and guarantees to maritime Southeast Asia through bilateral security relationships whilst ASEAN developed indigenous forms of association which it sought to extend to Vietnam. The US' and ASEAN's performance of these functions were complementary in that they were both aimed towards embedding an anti-communist order in maritime Southeast Asia and neutralising the perceived threat from Vietnam. The ASEAN states' regionalism enabled its members to demonstrate regional autonomy and the US' distance from direct military involvement in Southeast Asia satisfied a domestic population critical of its costly intervention in Vietnam.
Although not necessarily intentional, this reflected a clear division of labour. During Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, this division of labour was reinforced and shifted to include China.
ASEAN provided a diplomatic vanguard to delegitimise Vietnam's actions, whilst China threatened Vietnam and tied it down within Cambodia by aiding Cambodian rebels. The US acquiesced to China's invasion of Vietnam in 1979 and continued to provide support to the coalition from a distance (Emmers 2003 , Jones 2012 ). In the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific ASEAN has developed regional institutions that encompass all the major regional powers, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and East Asia Summit (EAS). All the great powers have signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), recognising ASEAN's norms in return for joining the EAS. ASEAN's diplomatic leadership in providing forums for inclusive engagement and a normative framework all can agree on complements the US' continued provision of security public goods through its hub-and-spokes alliance network and China's increasing provision of economic public goods.
Such small power contribution to order has attracted vigorous debate (Emmers 2003 , Eaton and Stubbs 2006 , Ba 2009 , Jones 2012 , Acharya 2014 , Stubbs 2014 ). This paper's primary contribution is to bring the analysis of social roles into this debate. By analysing social role negotiation between ASEAN and the great powers, we can build on previous work to better understand how ASEAN's contribution fits into the regional division of labour. In particular this paper argues that ASEAN has come to perform important social roles as the 'primary manager' of Southeast Asian order and 'regional conductor' i of Asia-Pacific order as a result of reaching reciprocal role bargains with the great powers. These role bargains have established a division of labour with respect to the performance of functions in upholding regional order. The paper will show how these role bargains have been reached at key junctures from the early Cold War to the present day. During the Cold War, ASEAN's role bargains with the US and China established a division of labour where great powers provided security public goods but the key great power function of diplomatic leadership was transferred to ASEAN. ASEAN's diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia then provided a foundation for creating its 'regional conductor' role in the uncertainty after the Cold War and embedding it within renewed role bargains vis-a-vis the US'
'offshore great power guarantor' role and China's 'responsible regional great power' role. ASEAN's ability to sustain its prominence in order negotiation and management is due to its redefining, reclaiming and renegotiating its evolving roles within bargains with the great powers.
This paper advances its arguments through three sections. The first discusses the debate regarding ASEAN's contribution to regional order and explores how alternative approaches have understood ASEAN's role. It argues that each approach captures important aspects of ASEAN's role but that a social roles analysis, rooted in an English School (ES) conceptual framework, better provides the flexibility necessary to account for cumulative and ongoing ASEAN-great power negotiations. The second section outlines an analytical framework for tracing social role negotiation based on legitimation whereby an actor claims a role and seeks endorsement from key legitimating constituencies. The third section then applies this framework to three periods: 1954-1975, when ASEAN's 'primary manager' role was created through a bargain with the US vis-a-vis the US' 'offshore great power guarantor' role in maritime Southeast Asia; 1979-1991, during the Cambodian conflict when ASEAN began to extend its 'primary manager' role to mainland Southeast Asia through a role bargain with China which legitimised China's 'regional great power guarantor' role;
1991-present, when ASEAN built on cumulative role negotiation to create its 'regional conductor' role in the wider Asia-Pacific region. This paper concludes by highlighting the current challenges for ASEAN in maintaining role bargains with the great powers under increasing great power rivalry.
Debating ASEAN's role
For a long time ASEAN's role was understood through an implicitly realist lens. Leifer captured well the nature of ASEAN's role as a moderately successful regional manager within its own subregion and a diplomatic community that could act collectively beyond its subregion (Leifer 1989 ). However, realists considered ASEAN's role contingent on the balance of power between the great powers. Any regional division of labour would therefore reflect how power was balanced within the region and whether the great powers had an interest in granting ASEAN a role, or whether their disinterest essentially left ASEAN to its own devises. It was the latter that led to ASEAN taking up its regional management role as Britain and the US drew-down their military commitments leaving ASEAN states to take responsibility for managing their own relations and prevent a vacuum being filled by other external powers. The communist victories in Indochina boosted ASEAN's internal managerial role but its external diplomatic role was only boosted after
Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia drew the interests of China and the US back into Southeast Asia making ASEAN a partner in balancing against Vietnam. ASEAN then found space to extend its regional management into the Asia-Pacific by forming the ARF because of the strategic uncertainty immediately after the Cold War and because no great power individually or collectively was willing or able to provide leadership in creating a regional security organisation. As long as great power rivalry continued then the great powers had an interest in passing the buck of regional institution-building to ASEAN and ASEAN's promotion of consultation and conflict avoidance could enjoy limited success (Leifer 1996 , Emmers 2003 .
Constructivists challenged this approach, arguing that ASEAN could actively shape great power interests in maintaining its prominence by acting as a norm entrepreneur and socialiser (Johnston 2008 , Acharya 2009 . ASEAN was continuing a tradition of Asian actors localising external norms and creating indigenous norms. These formed a normative structure which determined what was appropriate for different types of powers to do in the region and thereby accounted for the region's division of labour. ASEAN's success in establishing the ARF reflected the embeddedness of sovereignty and anti-colonialism in the normative structure; non-hierarchical cooperative security led by small powers was more appropriate than great power-led collective security (Acharya 2009 ). ASEAN's informal forums offered conducive environments for socialising wary great powers into accepting and internalising these norms. China's increasing comfort with multilateralism and moves towards a benign good neighbour policy in the early 2000s were seen as reflecting such internalisation (Johnston 2008) . However, China's recent assertive turn has challenged this argument and there remains the outstanding question of why bilateral great powersmall power security ties, where domination is more acute, were considered appropriate within the division of labour. This suggests the need to look beyond the intersection between structure and state interaction in understanding how state interests and norms can be differently interpreted and instrumentalised in realising the regional division of labour.
Critical theorists have done so by highlighting the importance of domestic social forces (Jones 2012) . Jones has convincingly shown that ASEAN's preference for regional cooperation based on non-interference is not due to the salience of norms but rooted in the politics of ruling classes within ASEAN states and their concern to insulate social conflicts from external interference. He has argued that this makes ASEAN's regional management defensive in nature aiming to keep unwanted issues off the regional agenda rather than offering any substantive normative leadership (Jones 2010 (Jones , 2012 . However, ASEAN's place in the regional division of labour depends on ASEAN satisfying great power demands. This has meant issues such as human rights and democracy promotion, particularly pertaining to Myanmar, have had to be included on ASEAN's regional agenda (Jones 2012: 180-210) .
Some important insights emerge from the exchanges between realist, constructivist and critical approaches which can be fruitfully brought together. These are that the balance of power alongside prevailing norms are critically important in providing a political context within which actors interact. However, these contexts are not determinate but are themselves shaped by interaction, contestation and negotiation between states and important social forces. Bringing these insights together is where a role negotiation framework comes in. The negotiation of roles between states takes place within prevailing distributions of capabilities and normative/political contexts but is shaped by competing social forces who seek to achieve certain interests through conceptualising particular roles for their state and having others states perform complementary roles (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016) .
The role negotiation framework that this paper develops draws influence from recent constructivist writings on role theory, particularly in understanding the concepts of role conceptions, role expectations and role enactment (Harnisch et al 2011) . However, it departs from their efforts to develop generalisable theoretical models for analysing role processes (role making, role-taking, role bargaining etc) between agents interacting within social structures. This paper instead positions its analysis of roles within an English School conceptual framework, asserting that social roles constitute a key aspect of a broader social and purposive arrangement that the ES identifies within the concept of international order (Bull 1995 , Hurrell 2007 . The ES seeks to understand how particular international and regional orders are constituted through the negotiation and mutual understandings of the members of international or regional society. A central feature of such negotiation is legitimacy, analysed by scholars working within the ES specifically in relation to how great and small powers reach bargains over respective responsibilities towards building and managing order (Goh 2011 , Clark 2011 , Bukovansky et al 2012 . This paper contributes to this work by developing a simple framework based on the practice of legitimation which helps capture roles negotiation between actors interacting within their specific social and historical contexts.
In relation to ASEAN this paper also builds on Alice Ba's work on cumulative negotiation (Ba 2009 ) and complements Stubbs' understanding of ASEAN's leadership as part of a regional division of labour (Stubbs 2014 contribution to regional order. Ba's work on intra-ASEAN consensus over great power roles is however highly relevant in understanding these bargains. Stubbs (2014) has addressed this to a certain extent by arguing that ASEAN's leadership is limited to providing initiatives for consultation and cooperation whilst other powers provide security or economic leadership. Stubbs (2014) argues that ASEAN has shown significant entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership in carving out its place in the division of labour which complements its status as a non-threatening and neutral player. This is down to ASEAN's 'competence power' (Eaton and Stubbs 2006) . This paper goes further by showing how this division of labour has been negotiated by ASEAN and the great powers as part of their respective social roles over a number of decades. This division of labour includes: the US providing security public goods as the 'offshore great power guarantor'; China providing regional economic public goods and strategic restraint as the 'responsible regional great power'; Japan providing regional economic and financial public goods through its 'regional economic great power' role; and ASEAN providing diplomatic leadership as the 'regional conductor'. Before showing how this played out the next section outlines the role negotiation analytical framework.
Role negotiation in international society
This section has two aims: 1) define the concept of order and situate social roles and the notion of a role bargain within this concept of order; 2) outline the process of role negotiation and show how it can be operationalised through analysing the practice of legitimation.
Order is "a formal or informal arrangement that sustains rule-governed interaction among …
[groups or individuals] ... in their pursuit of individual and collective goals" (Alagappa 2003: 39) .
The relevant goals will depend on context but we can understand rules as taking three inter-related forms: explicit legal rules set out in treaties; implicit norms that determine appropriate and inappropriate behaviour; and fundamental 'deep rules', known as primary institutions (Buzan 2004 , Khong 2014 . Primary institutions are "durable and recognised patterns of shared practices rooted in values held commonly by the members of ... societies, and embodying a mix of norms, rules and principles" (Buzan 2004: 181) . Primary institutions constitute international society; they reflect the 'rules of the game' which provide a normative foundation for order that constitutes who the members are and regulates their behaviour. The two primary institutions most concerned with how order is negotiated and managed are great power management and diplomacy. It is within these institutions that we can find ES discussion of social roles. satisfies their interests within the prevailing social and political context. We can identify an implicit role bargain within the institution of great power management, which sets out not only the great power role but also a corresponding small power role (Bull 1995 : 194-222, Buzan 2004 .
Small powers recognise the special status and rights of great powers, but great powers need to exercise their responsibilities towards order and recognise small power identities, their status as sovereign states and also the functions they may perform in upholding order.
The great power role has received ample attention for obvious reasons within great power management, but the functions small powers perform has generally been neglected and instead considered as falling within the primary institution of diplomacy (Khong 2014) . However, if great and small powers' respective responsibilities are negotiated as part of a reciprocal bargain, then it makes sense to consider these under a single institution. This paper merges great power management and diplomacy into a broader primary institution of 'order management', which does not presuppose that great powers exclusively have responsibility for negotiating and managing order. This allows us to look at how actors may negotiate variegated responsibilities towards order (Bukovansky et al 2012) . Order management is conceptually made up of context-specific 'order functions'. Different functions will be relevant depending on the order under study and will be performed by different actors according to the particular negotiations that have taken place. Table 1 outlines broad categories of order functions that might be found across different types of order, split into security, economic and diplomatic/normative functions. Lack of space precludes a discussion of each order function. However, it is necessary to highlight the key functions commonly attributed to great and small power roles to understand the implications of ASEAN-great power negotiations in redefining these roles. As great powers have superior capabilities they are also assumed to provide security and economic public goods as well as providing a general balance of power within international society and exercising local preponderance to keep other states in check (Bull 1995: 201-202, 207-212) . On top of this, they are considered to perform the primary diplomatic/normative function of diplomatic leadership through acting as a concert of powers or through institution-building. This is especially at times of crisis and transition when they are expected to negotiate order and build institutions to lock-in new order arrangements (Clark 2001 , Goh 2013 . The small power role is considered to include diplomatic/normative functions in the day-to-day politics of order, not at times of transition. These might include conflict mediation, advocacy and rule-making with respect to specific issues but not deeper questions of order (Panke 2012) . As we will see, the novelty of decoupling diplomatic leadership from the great power role and transferring it to the small power role in Southeast Asia, has led to ASEAN's unusual prominence in the negotiation and management of post-Cold War AsiaPacific order. Before showing how this unfolded it is necessary to outline the role negotiation analytical framework.
Security
Role negotiation involves three stages: role conceptualisation, role claiming and role
enactment. An actor first needs to conceptualise a role (identity, status, function) that they want to perform, either by locating a pre-existing role or conceptualising a new role. They then need to claim the role. If the actor receives endorsement for their role claims then they can legitimately enact the role by performing the functions associated with the role. If others contest the actor's role claims then the actor can either give up or re-conceptualise the role and re-claim it. Contestation from key constituencies within the audience over all or aspects of the role claim, often accompanied by counter-role claims from certain key constituencies, will most likely occur at times when order is in transition or unstable. When order appears to be stable it likely means that the role claimant and the audience have reached an agreement on what part different actors will play in making and managing order. This is when we can look for whether a role bargain has been established. We can know when a role bargain has been reached when there exists mutual agreement on: 1) a common goal for order; 2) what order functions need to be performed towards achieving that goal; 3) and who will perform which order functions. As part of a role bargain a role may be redefined (when a claim to a contested function is withdrawn and the function is transferred to actors whose identity or status makes them more acceptable performers of the function), an actor may take on a role or a new role may be created.
We can operationalise this framework through analysing the practice of legitimation (Reus- (Gerard 2014) . In seeking to capture the two-way process of claims and endorsement, we can understand communication more broadly than merely discursive communication. Figure 1 shows a spectrum of claims and endorsement moving from the least substantive, purely discursive claims/endorsement, to the most substantive claims/endorsement. understood their behaviour in relation to regional order and its goals, the functions that needed to be performed and who was considered the rightful performer of those functions.
To re-cap, order and social roles are socially negotiated and the key factor for understanding what order functions are relevant within a society and which actors will perform them, is legitimacy. To establish the legitimacy of a role an actor must conceptualise the role, claim it and receive endorsement from the key constituencies of legitimation. The goal of role negotiation is to reach a role bargain: a reciprocal arrangement on respective roles. We will now apply this framework to the three case studies.
Role negotiation in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific
The US-ASEAN role bargain in Cold War Southeast Asia 1954 -1975 Between 1954 In contrast, Indonesia sought to embed an autonomous order in Southeast Asia, where external powers had no role and indigenous states managed their own affairs free from interference.
Indonesia's foreign policy reflected its emerging role conception as an 'indigenous great power liberator' built on its indigenous identity and its status as 'independent' and 'non-aligned', rooted in the fact that Indonesia achieved independence through revolution and did not align with either Cold War bloc. Indonesia's role claim was primarily directed at its domestic population as an activist anti-colonial foreign policy served to legitimise ruling governments within the highly diverse new nation. However, it needed endorsement from other states in order for this to be effective. Indonesia saw itself leading other emerging states towards autonomy and freedom by establishing the rules appropriate for Southeast Asian order: the Five Principles of Coexistence (Sukma 1995 After Bandung, with a precarious domestic position balanced between the anti-communist military and Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), Sukarno pursued a more radical foreign policy, reconceptualising the 'liberator' role from performing diplomatic leadership to revolutionary leadership (Leifer 1983) . Sukarno enacted the role by taking radical steps to purge any external great power presence from the region, seizing foreign assets and pursuing confrontation against West Irian (still under Dutch influence) and Malaysia (considered a British plot to maintain its influence). Sukarno framed these confrontations as the continuation of Indonesia's revolution and tried to enlist support through a new grouping to rival the UN, the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) (Jones 2002) .
The responses of the relevant constituencies of legitimation in Southeast Asia to the US' role claims were mixed but they rejected Indonesia's claims. Thailand, the Philippines and Malaya entered into security alliances with Western powers and supported the US' efforts to fight communism in Indochina. The Philippines and Thailand sent forces to support the US-led effort and Malaysia and Singapore supported US training of South Vietnamese officers at the Jungle Warfare School in Johor (Ang 2010) . Such allies also promoted the anti-communist cause diplomatically.
Philippine diplomat Carlos Romulo defended regional states' decisions to take part in collective defence with external powers as an act of self-determination and a protection of sovereignty (Jones 2005 The new conception of 'offshore great power guarantor' was reflected in the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, which established that the US would keep treaty commitments and provide a nuclear shield over the region but would no longer commit troops to support regional allies against insurgency (Gurtov 1974) . The US' main concern was a face-saving withdrawal from Vietnam, but to the extent there was concern about how the region evolved, US officials expected regional states to organise themselves. This represented a withdrawal of any claim to diplomatic leadership or stewardship leaving space for regional states to play a bigger part in shaping regional order. Negotiations over ASEAN's form during 1966 ASEAN's form during -1975 had important implications for the division of functions in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN states eschewed collective security functions but took responsibility for promoting 'regional resilience' by establishing that they would not interfere in each other's affairs in a way that undermined members' regime consolidation and economic development (Ba 2009 ). ASEAN also became the primary instrument through which members managed their mutual relations without interference from external powers. For example, during the Corregidor dispute when Philippine-Malaysian relations soured over Philippine claims to Sabah, US officials made a point of not getting involved despite calls from Thai and Philippine officials for US intervention iii .
The dispute was managed to a large extent by Indonesian and Thai mediation through ASEAN and the fact that Philippine and Malaysian officials sought to de-escalate the dispute reflected the value they saw in ASEAN (Acharya 2014: 48) . ASEAN therefore became the 'primary manager' of intraregional relations and intra-regional rule-making in non-communist Southeast Asia. ASEAN By decoupling diplomatic leadership from the great power role and transferring it to regional states, ASEAN and the US redefined the great power role in Southeast Asia.
China, ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict: 1978-1991 In late states also sought to draw the US into funding the non-communist rebel factions with limited success (Jones 2012) . ASEAN was, however, able to commit China to supporting a neutral Cambodia. In 1981 Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang assured ASEAN that China supported an independent, neutral and non-aligned Cambodia and had no intention of imposing a communist regime or making Cambodia a Chinese satellite (Chang 1985: 123) . By securing this commitment, ASEAN aimed to play the predominant part in order negotiation and management in the whole of Southeast Asia after the Cambodian conflict was resolved. It could not fully realise this during the Cambodian conflict as the communist states in mainland Southeast Asia contested ASEAN's role.
However, in the 1990s ASEAN achieved this aim as all the mainland states sought ASEAN membership.
ASEAN 's 'regional conductor' role: 1991-present In the immediate post-Cold War years, ASEAN faced irrelevance as the Cold War logic underpinning the previous role bargains fell apart. The ASEAN states took steps to sure up the US' commitment to security public goods by individually agreeing access arrangements (Ba 2009: 165-169 ) and engaged China to socialise it into considering itself a 'responsible regional great power' rather than seeking to revise regional order (Wanandi 1996) . To ensure its continued relevance ASEAN needed to create a new role.
ASEAN's response to various proposals for regional security dialogue emanating from the Soviet Union, Canada and Australia revealed its emerging 'regional conductor' role conception (Dewitt 1994) . ASEAN saw these as a threat due to the fact that ASEAN may either be subsumed within them or marginalised (Ba 2009 ASEAN emphasised its indigenous identity through rejecting 'external' proposals for security dialogue as inappropriate for Asian culture and instead promoting its own model. It highlighted its neutrality and status as a successful manager through the design of the proposed dialogue based on the 'ASEAN way': informal dialogue, moving at a pace comfortable to all, with all decisions based on consensus (Acharya 2014: 171-173 that time due to its economic success and its diplomatic contribution (Brown 2003) . Japan was the most enthusiastic endorser, supporting Singapore in reaching a consensus within ASEAN on security dialogue and helping to bring the US around (Satoh 1995) . China was initially sceptical about multilateralism, seeing it as another means of containment in the wake of the Tiananmen Square killings. However, ASEAN's assurances that the dialogue would be informal with consensus decision-making reassured the Chinese that they would not be singled out within the process.
ASEAN enacted its 'regional conductor' role by convening the first full regional 'orchestra' at the ARF. Through the function of 'inclusive engagement', ASEAN provided a new basis for its relevance in the post-Cold War context. ASEAN's 'score' was also accepted by the regional 'orchestra'; the ARF Concept Paper described the TAC 'as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation' (ASEAN 1995) . ASEAN therefore contributed to emerging regional order by ensuring that it would be norm-governed, based on ASEAN norms provided in the TAC.
ASEAN situated its 'regional conductor' role within reciprocal role bargains with the US vis-à-vis its 'offshore great power guarantor' role and China vis-à-vis its emerging 'responsible regional great power' role. ASEAN did not challenge the US' bilateral alliances through its proposed security dialogue, nor 'draw a line down the Pacific' by developing an exclusive East Asian regional grouping; rather, by inviting the US to join the ARF, ASEAN helped the Clinton administration sell its Asia-focused foreign policy domestically in a way that did not alienate regional states through appearing as an 'international nanny' (Goh 2004) . ASEAN was also able to demonstrate regional autonomy in shaping the emerging regional order in a way that maintained its relevance. In return Japanese and Chinese willingness to support ASEAN after the financial crisis, meant ASEAN was able to establish summit-level ASEAN Plus One and ASEAN Plus Three (APT) frameworks with the two states and South Korea giving institutional form to an 'East Asian' region that did not include the US. ASEAN nested the APT within the ASEAN process meaning it was able to maintain control over how East Asian regionalism developed (Dent 2010: 8) . ASEAN used the Plus One and APT processes to channel emerging Sino-Japanese competition into two order-building processes:
negotiating regional order functions as the two states competed to contribute to the Chiang Mai
Initiative and promote regional trade agreements; and providing a 'vision' for a regional 'East Asian community' (Goh 2013: 61-68) . The eventual outcome of negotiations over regional order functions and a vision for East Asian community was the ASEAN-led East Asia Summit established in 2005.
ASEAN strengthened its 'regional conductor' role by asserting that the EAS be convened in ASEAN states and that membership was dependent on making a formal commitment to ASEAN's 'score' by signing the TAC. Since then, ASEAN has seen off challenges in the form of alternative 'architecture' proposals (e.g. former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's Asia-Pacific Community proposal) and expanded the number of forums within which it performs the 'regional conductor' role, including the expanded EAS (with Russian and US membership) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus. There is now a general understanding amongst the western states that the EAS is the premier political and security forum and should be supported and developed rather than new institutions being proposed (Fuchs 2015) .
The major challenge for ASEAN in maintaining its role is in upholding role bargains that are acceptable to the great powers. The ASEAN-US bargain has been re-invigorated after the challenges of the Bush administration. The US has endorsed ASEAN's role through signing the TAC, establishing the ASEAN-US summit, establishing a permanent US ambassador to ASEAN and upgrading the US-ASEAN relationship to a 'strategic partnership'. It has also renewed its commitment to provide security public goods as part of the 'rebalance'. However, the US now expects ASEAN to use its diplomatic leadership to leigitimise US interests and preponderance in the South China Sea. US officials' expect ASEAN to promote a 'rules-based order', with an emphasis on upholding freedom of navigation and overflight and obstructing China's efforts to consolidate its control over the SCS (Hachigian 2015) . The problem with this is that it exacerbates existing issues between ASEAN and China. There is a question regarding China's commitment to the 'responsible regional great power' role as it was defined in the 1990s-2000s during China's 'good neighbour' strategy. China seems to have dropped its commitment towards 'restraint' and now seeks to redefine what its rights and responsibilities are in the region (Deng 2015) . Evidence of this can be seen in the China-led One Belt, One Road initiative, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), LancangMekong Cooperation (LMC) mechanism as well as China's 'assertiveness' in the SCS. This has tested ASEAN's ability to maintain an acceptable role bargain with China, especially as China has sought to scupper any efforts at ASEAN developing a consensus on the SCS and instead re-focus ASEAN's attention to the broader ASEAN-China relationship whilst promoting bilateral negotiations with claimants over the SCS. This is not acceptable for the original ASEAN-5 and
Vietnam which are uncomfortable with the prospect of Chinese hegemony, although the Philippines has softened its approach since the election of President Duterte. ASEAN therefore appears stuck: it cannot wield its authority as a 'regional conductor' in the SCS because of Chinese contestation and lack of consensus but it needs to act in order to meet the US' expectations. This means its 'regional conductor' role is in a precarious balance between consolidation and deterioration as the expectations of two powerful legitimating constituencies pull ASEAN in different directions.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that ASEAN's prominence in regional order negotiation and management in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific is based on ASEAN performing legitimate social roles as the 'primary manager' and 'regional conductor'. It presented a framework for analysing role negotiation and showed how this framework can be applied to negotiations between ASEAN and the great powers from the early Cold War years to the present day. Through this we can better understand how ASEAN's prominence is part of a regional division of labour developed through cumulative social role negotiation. The question of the future of ASEAN's role depends on ASEAN being able to manage the competing pressures of great power rivalry and continue renegotiating role bargains with the great powers. This is made uncertain by: what the expectations of the great powers are with respect to their own roles and ASEAN's role particularly vis-à-vis the SCS conflict; and whether ASEAN can reach a consensus on the SCS issue and maintain some sort of unity in demonstrating its continued competence to perform inclusive engagement and rule-making. It remains to be seen how ASEAN can manage these two related challenges.
